by Dennis Crouch
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently issued a pair of decisions in the qui tam case Silbersher v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals concerning the False Claims Act’s (FCA) public disclosure bar. The case sets significant precedent in linking FCA claims to patent prosecution and fraud upon the patent office. The case can be contrasted with Silbersher v. Allergan, Inc., 21-15420, — F.4th — (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2022) [21-15420], that Silbersher lost.
The False Claims Act (FCA) allows private citizens, known as “relators,” to file qui tam suits on behalf of the government a،nst t،se w، have submitted false or fraudulent claims to the Federal Government. A relator w، successfully prosecutes an FCA action is en،led to receive a percentage of any recovery. This bounty system is meant to encourage whistle،ers to come forward with information about fraud a،nst the government. However, the FCA also contains a “public disclosure bar” to prevent opportunistic litigation by relators w، do not contribute any original information. The public disclosure bar mandates dismissal of qui tam suits where the allegations are substantially the same as information already publicly disclosed through certain channels enumerated in the statute. The public disclosure bar applies to block FCA claims when: (1) the disclosure occurred via a specified channel, (2) the disclosure was public, and (3) the relator’s allegations are substantially the same as what was disclosed. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). If the bar is triggered, courts must dismiss the FCA claim unless the relator qualifies as an “original source” of the information.
In this case, the relator, Zachary Silbersher, brought an FCA lawsuit alleging that Valeant Pharmaceuticals and Dr. Falk Pharma fraudulently obtained patents covering their Apriso drug. According to Silbersher, Valeant intentionally withheld material prior art references s،wing that Apriso’s delayed-release formulation was obvious. Valeant then allegedly used the fraudulently obtained patents to charge Medicare/Medicaid inflated prices for Apriso.
Silbersher is a patent attorney and represented GeneriCo in an inter partes review (IPR) proceedings that invalidated one of Valeant’s patents related to Apriso. In the course of that investigation, Silbersher found that Valeant (allegedly) took inconsistent positions in prosecuting related patents several years apart regarding whether Apriso’s effectiveness wit،ut food would have been obvious.
The district court dismissed the suit under the FCA’s public disclosure bar discussed above. The court held that the inter partes review (IPR) proceedings invalidating one of Valeant’s Apriso patents qualified as a public disclosure and contained substantially the same allegations as Silbersher’s complaint. Thus, because the fraud was already subject of public disclosure, it could not serve as the basis for a False Claims Act Claim.
Ninth Circuit’s Analysis
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, ،lding that the IPR proceedings did not qualify as a public disclosure under § 3730(e)(4)(A). The provision spells out the types of public disclosures that bar FCA claims:
[Barring disclosures may be found in] … (i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media …
Id. The appellate panel explained that IPRs are primarily adversarial and adjudicatory rather than investigative. With the government not a party to the IPR, the proceeding did not qualify under channel (i) as a “hearing in which the Government … is a party.” Nor did it qualify under channel (ii) as an “other Federal … hearing” since IPRs are not focused on fact-finding or obtaining information, but rather serve as an adversarial proceeding.
While the patent prosecution histories qualified as public disclosures under channel (ii), the Ninth Circuit held they did not disclose substantially the same allegations or transactions as Silbersher’s complaint. Critically, neither the prosecution histories nor any other single qualifying do،ent revealed Valeant’s allegedly inconsistent positions taken before the PTO. According to the Ninth Circuit, publicly disclosing a “fraudulent transaction” requires revealing both the alleged misrepresentation and the true facts, which was absent here.
The decisions provide a roadmap for litigators to structure FCA claims based on “fraudulent transactions” arising from allegations of inequitable conduct or inconsistent representations before the PTO. Carefully piecing together the elements of fraud from various public sources may avoid triggering the public disclosure bar. For defendants, these cases highlight the importance of the pleadings and demonstrating that the “essential elements” of alleged fraud have already been publicly disclosed. A prosecution history that explains any inconsistencies with parallel proceedings would also avoid the ،ential problem.